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Flexicurity in Belgium: 
A Proposal Based on Economic Principles
* 
 
The current unemployment insurance and employment protection legislation were set up in 
an economic environment in which relationships between workers and firms were typically 
long-lasting and stable. The increasing globalisation of the economy and the rapid 
technological and organisational changes require more flexibility of both workers and firms 
leading to career paths which are much more volatile both within and between firms. Current 
institutions must be therefore urgently reformed to reconcile this new need of more flexibility 
with that of security for workers. The call for “flexicurity” is not new, but there is no unanimity 
on the corresponding institutional model it implies. Rather than proposing a reform on the 
basis of existing institutions abroad, we propose a reform that is explicitly guided by 
economic principles. In a nutshell, we propose to transform the bulk of the advance notice 
payments by a unique lay-off contribution, independently of the type of worker (blue or white-
collar) and type of contract (temporary or open-ended). A severance payment, less important 
than the lay-off contribution, is due to cover the psychic cost related to dismissal. In order to 
make the employer accountable for the costs he imposes on society, the lay-off contribution 
should be made proportional to the cumulative past earnings since the moment that the 
worker was hired in the firm. This contribution would be used not only to finance a 
supplement to the current unemployment benefits, but also, as to make the worker more 
accountable, to finance active labour market policies for the unemployed. Aside of this 
scheme, it makes sense to generalise the current scheme of temporary unemployment 
benefits for blue-collar workers to white-collar workers, but only to the extent that one 
introduces experience rating in the funding, so that again the employers are made 
accountable for the social costs that they induce by these temporary lay-offs. 
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As many others, the current Unemployment insurance (UI) and employment protection legislation 
(EPL) “institutions” were set up in a economic environment in which relationships between workers 
and firms were typically long-lasting and stable. The increasing globalisation of the economy and the 
rapid technological and organisational changes require more flexibility of both workers and firms 
leading  to  career  paths  which  are  much  more  volatile  both  within  and  between  firms.  Current 
institutions must be therefore urgently reformed to reconcile this new need of more flexibility with 
that of security for workers. The call for “flexicurity” is not new, but there is no unanimity on the 
corresponding institutional model it implies.
4 Rather than proposing a reform on the basis of existing 
institutions abroad, we believe that it is essential to first formulate some explicit principles guiding 
this reform rooted in economic analysis. Making these principles explicit is a distinctive feature of our 
approach compared to De Vos and Konings (2007) and Sels (2008). In a second step, after a brief 
summary of Belgian labour market institutions, we reflect on how to translate these principles to 
concrete guidelines of reform of the current institutions in Belgium.  
 
 
1. General Principles for the Design of Labour Market Institutions 
The Design of Employment Protection 
Our starting point is the following citation of Blanchard and Tirole (2004):  
   
Let us begin with a broad principle: Economic agents can be given discretion provided that 
they  bear  the  cost  that  their  decisions  impose  on  other  agents.  This  ‘internalization  of 
externalities’ ensures that the decision-maker in question reflects others’ preferences and is 
therefore accountable. For example, it is widely accepted that polluters ought to pay for the 
social cost of their pollution. 
The translation of this broad principle in the matter of employment is that firms ought to pay 
for the cost they impose on society when they lay workers off. This cost includes the financial 
cost born by the unemployment insurance (UI) fund and the psychological and other costs 
born by the dismissed worker.
5… (Blanchard and Tirole, 2004, p. 4)  
 
Our starting point is therefore the general principle that firms should pay for the costs that lay-offs 
impose on society. It’s important to note that the financial costs born by the UI fund include the cost 
of active labour market policies (ALMP) needed to insert the unemployed back into employment. In 
addition, not mentioned in the citation, the loss of tax payments, required to finance public goods 
and other transfers than unemployment benefits (UB), is part of the social cost induced by a lay-off. 
 
Blanchard and Tirole (2003, 2004, 2008) explain nevertheless that, since the real world exhibits a 
number  of  imperfections,  this  general  principle  requires  a  refinement.  For  instance,  one  of  the 
                                                           
4  For  a  recent  discussion  on  flexicurity  from  an  international  perspective,  we  refer  the  reader  to  a  special  issue  on 
Flexicurity in the CESifo DICE Report, Journal for Institutional Comparison, Volume 6, No. 4, Winter 2008.  
5 Collective layoffs may further impose substantial costs on local communities in a depressed area.   3 
difficulties of the scheme is that the firms can shift the increased cost of lay-off on the worker by 
refusing to hire disadvantaged workers with high unemployment risk or paying them lower wages.
6 
In addition, financially fragile firms could go broke as a consequence of the increased liability or they 
could  evade  their  responsibility,  notably  by  delocalisation  or  by  deliberately  reducing  their 
capitalisation. As consequence of these and other complications, Blanchard and Tirole conclude that 
firms should be made only partially responsible for the costs they impose by laying-off their workers. 
It is, however, impossible with the current knowledge to determine the optimal compensation that 
firms are due at lay-off. 
Even if we cannot determine the optimal degree to which employers should be made responsible for 
their lay-off decisions, a general principle of incentive pay (the “informativeness principle”) dictates 
that the degree of responsibility should increase to the extent that one can exclude components of 
the lay-off cost for which the employer cannot be made accountable (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 
219). For instance, lay-offs can be a consequence of external factors that are beyond the control of 
the individual firm. The fall in aggregate demand, as generated by the recent financial crisis, is a 
typical  example.  The  degree  of  responsibility  should  therefore  increase  if  we  could  relate  the 
compensation at lay-off to the difference between the lay-off costs induced by the firm and the 
average lay-off costs in the economy. 
Once economic agents are made responsible for their acts, they “can be given discretion”. This 
means that one should not require firms to justify economic lay-offs
7 in court, as e.g. in France. 
Judicial  procedures  cannot  be  efficient  since  it  is  too  costly  for  a  judge  to  gather  the  relevant 
information required to determine whether the lay-off is economically justified.         
What form should the firm's contribution take? Should it take the form of a lump-sum severance 
payment  to  the  worker  or  of  a  lay-off  contribution  to  the  UI  fund  that  finances  a  stream  of 
unemployment benefits (UB) and active labour market policies (ALMP’s)? Here economic principles 
provide  more  clear-cut  policy  advice  (Blanchard  and  Tirole,  2003,  p.  22).  Suppose  that  all 
compensation would take the form of a lump-sum transfer to the dismissed worker such that it 
covers the cost of unemployment on average. This is clearly inefficient, since (i) this transfer will be 
too high if unemployment duration is less than average and too low if it is longer and (ii) job-seekers 
can only partially influence this length. The UI Agency insures the worker against this unemployment 
risk.  A  lump-sum  payment  is  only  justified  to  compensate  for  the  psychic  costs  of  becoming 
unemployed, unrelated to the cost of being unemployed: this could be e.g. the loss of a familiar work 
environment, of work relationships,... For most workers, the costs related to the unemployment risk 
are  without  doubt  much  larger  than  these  psychic  costs.  So,  we  can  conclude  that  a  lay-off 
contribution is needed in addition to a severance payment, the latter being relatively less important 
than the former. 
Should the compensation be due if the laid-off worker is immediately employed in another firm on a 
voluntary basis (or voluntarily withdraws from the labour market)? We argue that in that case the 
firm should only pay the severance payment that compensates for the psychic cost of unemployment 
and not the contribution to the UI fund, since the latter is no longer needed. It is important to realise 
                                                           
6 This problem can be partially resolved by targeting hiring subsidies to these workers, but it  may be complicated to 
practically implement these without abuse.  
7 Courts should, however, still guard against arbitrary lay-offs.    4 
that such a scheme provides incentives to the firm to finance outplacement services to the extent 
that this is cheaper than paying the contribution to the UI fund (Cahuc and Kramarz, 2004, p. 162).  
Finally, economic principles provide a justification for advance notice of dismissal (Pissarides, 2001). 
Where severance payments can in principle perfectly insure the worker against job loss, advance 
notice insures the worker against the risk of not being rehired after lay-off: during this period, the 
worker can search for a new job without any income loss. This justifies in principle a notice period of, 
say, a few months. The advance notice of dismissal is, however, costly, since the dismissed worker 
has no longer an incentive to be as productive as she used to be. That's the reason why employers 
often prefer the notice period not to be served. If this is the case, it may be more efficient to 
substitute a system of advance notice of dismissal by an adequate UI, at least to the extent that one 
can be entitled to it immediately after lay-off. 
Efficient Unemployment Insurance 
The UI fund should finance (i) the UB that compensates for the income loss induced by the dismissal; 
(ii) the cost of remedying the firm-specific human capital that is lost upon lay-off and the loss in 
general human capital in the course of the unemployment spell. Since job-search effort is imperfectly 
observed by the administrators of the UI fund, we cannot fully insure the unemployed workers 
against earnings loss. For, full insurance would drastically reduce the incentive to search for jobs and 
to accept job offers. Incentives can be provided financially (by a decreasing profile of UB or of a hiring 
bonus/tax to/on the worker
8) or non-financially (by offering job search training and intermediation 
services, by imposing job search requirements and/or by verifying the acceptance of suitable job 
offers).      
To  compensate  for  the  loss  in  human capital,  the worker  should  participate  in  suitable  training 
programmes.  If training is too costly, e.g. because the worker is close to retirement age, the worker 
could receive a wage subsidy to compensate for the lost productivity. Since the social benefits of 
investment in human capital exceed the private benefits, it may be necessary to offer this training at 
reduced cost, or even to either subsidise or enforce participation in training.      
From the above discussion it is clear that the Unemployment Agency (UA)
9 has a specific mission. 
Since the worker underestimates the social value of employment,
10 the choice of the appropriate 
allocation of funds between UB and ALMP’s cannot be left to the worker. This is the responsibility of 
the government through the UA. The UA should aim at maximizing the expected lifetime welfare of 
the unemployed workers given scarce public resources. A complication is that this requires aligning 
the objective of the employees of the UA to the aforementioned goal. This could partly be resolved 
by appropriate incentive contracts, but since it is difficult to measure the objective precisely, the 
design of such incentive contracts is hazardous (see e.g. Cockx, 2000). 
                                                           
8 See Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). 
9 By UA we refer to the agency that is responsible for both the payment of UB and the provision of ALMP. In Belgium, the 
two functions are separated, a federal agency being responsible for the first mentioned service and the regional public 
employment services (PES) for the second. We discuss the issue of decentralisation in another contribution (Cockx and Van 
der Linden, 2009).     
10 For, in addition to the private gains, society as a whole has to finance less benefits and collects more taxes.   5 
 
2. Guidelines for a Reform of Employment Protection and 
Unemployment Insurance in Belgium 
The Current Institutional Setting in a Nutshell
11 
In the current institutional setting essentially two institutions protect workers against job loss: The 
Unemployment Insurance (UI) and the employment protection regulations (EPL). First, in Belgium 
employers need not justify the reason of dismissal,
12 but they must notify workers sufficiently in 
advance if they want to dismiss a worker. The notice period need not be served if the employer 
compensates  the  worker  by  paying  out  the  wage  due  in  this  notice  period.  This  corresponds 
therefore to a severance payment. In Belgium, the notice period is much higher for white-collar 
workers than for blue-collars. It also differs according to the collective agreement in the sector, the 
nature of the contract (open-ended, fixed-term,...) and on whether the worker is serving a trial 
period or not. Special procedures apply if there is a collective dismissal, i.e. if the employer lays-off a 
group of workers simultaneously. The timing of the procedure is complex. The employer must in due 
time inform workers, their unions and the regional public employment service (PES). This implies that 
the lay-off has to be justified. Unions have time to raise questions and suggest alternatives to the lay-
offs but employers and unions need not reach an agreement. Except for some categories of workers, 
the severance payment is larger than in the case of an individual lay-off. Moreover, firms are obliged 
to finance outplacement services. 
In  Belgium we  distinguish  between two  UI schemes:  the  temporary  UI  scheme and  the  general 
scheme.
13 Currently, only blue-collar workers are eligible to the temporary scheme but employers 
plead  for  an  extension  to  white  collars.
14  It  allows  firms  to  temporarily  lay-off  their  employees 
without needing to pay out severance payments since the labour contract remains valid. Firms can 
make use of this scheme if the economic activity in the firm is temporarily reduced for external 
reasons, among which economic ones, such as a temporary drop in demand. Workers are entitled to 
a constant level of unemployment benefits until they are recalled.  
Workers with a sufficiently long employment record are entitled to the UB of the general UI scheme 
if they are involuntarily laid off.
15 The eligibility period starts after the end of the higher mentioned 
notice period (even if the latter is not effectively served). The level and profile of the UB depends on 
the household composition (head of household, single or dependant of the head of household). The 
level is a fraction of the wage with a floor and a cap. The average net replacement rate is relatively 
                                                           
11  For  a  more  precise  description,  see  http://www.rva.fgov.be,  http://www.emploi.belgique.be/home.aspx,  and 
http://belgium.angloinfo.com/countries/belgium/contracts.asp.    
12 The worker is protected against arbitrary dismissal though. There also exists a long list of protected workers (see e.g. De 
Vos and Konings, 2007). 
13 Replacement ratios and/or caps have been revised upwards in January 2009. 
14 As social partners could not agree on a reform, the federal government has agreed upon three measures on April 30, 
2009. These measures are in principle limited to the year 2009. The two first ones are respectively a collective and an 
individual subsidized reduction in working time while the third one introduces temporary lay-offs for blue- and white-collars 
under some conditions (in particular, a collective agreement).  
15 If the employment record is too short, they are only entitled to a minimum income guarantee provided by the Social 
Assistance scheme. School-leavers are also entitled to UB after some waiting period. For purposes of simplification, we do 
not discuss this specific entitlement here (see e.g. Van der Linden, 2007).    6 
low  according  to  international  standards:  68%,  well  below  the  73%  average  in  neighbouring 
countries.
16 Heads of households are indefinitely entitled to the same level of UB. The UB for singles 
and dependants decreases with unemployment duration, but is bounded below by a flat rate UB. 
Since 2004, job-search effort of long-term unemployed workers is verified and workers may lose 
their entitlement to UB if this effort is regarded insufficient (see Cockx et al., 2007). UI is provided at 
the federal level. It’s financed through social security contributions that are proportional to the gross 
wage.
17 Active labour market programmes (ALMP) are mainly provided by the Regions.  
What's wrong with the current institutional setting? 
By varying the replacement rate according to the household type, by the imposition of floors and 
caps, and by providing a number of ad hoc supplementary benefits,
18 the Belgian UI system has more 
evolved from an insurance scheme to an unemployment assistance scheme with low replacement 
rates for high wage workers (but, if white collar, highly protected by the EPL) and high replacement 
rates for low wage workers. Such a scheme lacks transparency and leads to unemployment traps, 
especially for low-wage workers. A more transparent scheme would replace the advance notice 
payments at redundancy (more on this below) by an unemployment compensation that is initially 
characterised by a unique much higher replacement rate than currently, but that, as to provide the 
right incentives, would gradually taper off to lower rates the longer one remains unemployed.
19 
Long-term unemployed workers and low-wage workers would be guaranteed a minimum income. 
Since monetary incentives for minimum income recipients no longer work, incentives for this group 
should rather take the form of, depending on their effectiveness, the provision of ALMP at reduced 
costs (or for free, or even subsidised), or by imposing job search requirements and/or by verifying 
the acceptance of suitable job offers.  
Currently, the UI scheme is financed on the basis of contributions that are independent of lay-off 
behaviour.
20 This does not at all induce employers to internalize the costs their lay-off decisions 
impose on society. In contrast, advance notice payments provided for at dismissal from an open-
ended contract make employers accountable for their lay-off behaviour. However, as explained in 
the first section, this is not an efficient way of insuring workers. Moreover, in Belgium the level of 
employment protection differs substantially not only according to the seniority in the firm and the 
wage level, but also to the type of employment contract. Advance notice payments are generally 
very high for well-paid white-collar workers in open-ended contracts. In contrast, blue-collar workers 
and all workers who are not (yet) employed in open-ended contracts are relatively weakly protected 
                                                           
16  See  www.oecd.org/els/social/workincentives  (Table  on  net  replacement  rates  during  a  5-year  period  following 
unemployment, 2001-2004). Since then, the level of UB has been revised upwards in Belgium. 
17 The contribution rates are respectively 1,46% (0,87%) for employers (employees). An additional contribution rate of 
1,69% is charged to employers occupying at least 10 workers. Finally, there exists a contribution rate to finance a Fund that 
under specific circumstances pay allowances to redundant workers in case of a firm closing (0,25% up to 19 employees, 
0,29% above). 
18 Such as additional child benefits after six months and the benefits to which long-term unemployed workers are entitled 
by working a small amount of time in specialized agencies (“PWA/ALE”). 
19 One may avoid a rapid decrease of the level of UB if, in addition, incentives are provided by a bonus paid out to workers 
who find employment. However, a constant bonus is then not sufficient. It must decrease with unemployment duration and 
one should allow it to become negative, i.e. to become a tax, if unemployment lasts long (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997). 
20  A  notable  exception  is,  since  2005,  the  “accountability  contribution”  paid  by  firms  in  the  construction  sector  who 
temporary lay-off workers during more than 110 days/year. From 2000 to 2002 a similar contribution existed in all sectors 
for  all  firms  making  excessive  use  of  temporary  UI  scheme.  This  scheme  hasn’t  been  prolonged,  however.  See  e.g. 
http://www.securex.eu/be/lex-go.nsf/vwNews_fr/791FD09EF44C23F5C1257108002E56C1?OpenDocument    7 
according to international standards. Workers in fixed term are relatively well protected before the 
expiration of the fixed term. However, at the specified term, the employer can fire the worker at no 
cost. This explains that the bulk of involuntary separations in Belgium is made of workers ending 
fixed-term contacts: they account for 70% of the involuntary separations (Delhez et al., 2008) and 
this in a labour market where fixed term contracts represent less than 9% of the stock of salaried 
workers. Since the heterogeneity in EPL between contracts cannot reflect differences in the social 
cost of dismissal, the differentiation of EPL according to contract type is socially inefficient.  
 
Finally, there is another feature of the Belgian EPL that is matter for concern. The level of advance 
notice  payments  for  well-paid-white  collar  workers  is  not  fixed  in  advance,  but  needs  to  be 
determined by mutual agreement between the worker and the employer. This leads to uncertainty 
and, possibly judicial costs if no agreement is reached. We believe that efficiency would be enhanced 
by determining the level of these payments clearly in advance. 
Guidelines for the Reform 
1. A unique level of liabilities whatever the type of labour contract. We do not see any theoretical 
justification for a distinction of the level of the advance notice payments according to the type of 
worker (blue or white collar) or the type of contract (temporary, open-ended, ...). We therefore 
plead for establishing a unique level of liabilities that firms are due when laying off any type of 
worker.  Firms  could  continue  to  make  use  of  workers  occupied  by  temporary  work  agencies. 
However, the contract between these agencies and their workers would be a standard one in terms 
of liabilities in case of a lay-off. The liabilities would be established at a level that is certainly below 
the current one for high-paid white-collar workers.  
2. A lay-off contribution. The level of firms' liabilities should be proportional to the cost a lay-off 
imposes on society. Since one can only imperfectly identify dismissals for which individual firms can 
be held accountable, the lay-off contribution should only be partially related to the cost imposed on 
society. The contribution should therefore increase with the wage level (since both the level of UB’s 
and the amount of lost taxes increase with wages), with job tenure (since the loss in firm-specific 
human capital increases with tenure) and with the expected unemployment duration (since the UB 
payments and the amount of lost taxes increases with unemployment duration).  
Since  to  each  lay-off  corresponds  a  fixed  social  cost  (fixed  administrative  costs  related  to  the 
payment of UB and the organisation of ALMP),
21 the contribution should in principle contain a fixed 
component. However, this would make job creation for brief periods very costly. Consequently, this 
may hamper the insertion in the labour market for disadvantaged youth, for whom short-lived jobs 
can be stepping-stones to long-lasting jobs (Cockx, 2008; Cockx and Picchio, 2009). We therefore 
propose (as Cahuc and Kramarz, 2004) a lay-off contribution that increases at a higher rate during 
the first period of employment.
22 Finally, to induce firms to invest both in the prevention of the 
adverse consequences of lay-off and in outplacement, the lay-off contribution is only due if the 
worker is not voluntarily employed in another firm (or voluntarily withdraws from the labour market) 
immediately after dismissal. 
                                                           
21 The fixed psychic costs induced by a lay-off are directly covered by the severance payment to the worker (see point 3). 
22 Cahuc and Kramarz (2004) propose a period of 18 months for France.   8 
In  practise,  we  propose  a  contribution  that  satisfies  only  the  first  two  of  the  above-mentioned 
principles: a contribution that is proportional to the cumulative past earnings since the moment that 
the worker was hired in the firm, where the contribution rate would be higher during an initial period 
(Cahuc and Cramarz, 2004). This form is illustrated in Figure 1. The proposed lay-off contribution 
does  not  depend  on  unemployment  duration,  since  this  discourages  to  recruit  disadvantaged 
workers whose expected unemployment duration is high. The level of the lay-off contribution is then 
calculated on the basis of the average unemployment duration of a fired worker. Note, however, 
that, as a consequence, the proposed lay-off contribution makes temporary lay-offs too costly from a 
social point of view: the social cost of temporary lay-offs is lower, because they are shorter than an 
unemployment spell on average. This calls therefore for a separate scheme for temporary lay-offs. 
We will return to this point at the end of this section.  








Three refinements should be considered. First, according to the “informativeness principle”, the lay-
off contribution should depend on the difference between the lay-off costs induced by the firm and 
the average lay-off costs in the economy. This can be done retrospectively on the basis of the lay-off 
history. Secondly, financially fragile firms risk of going bankrupt when they are made accountable for 
their dismissals. Smaller firms should therefore pay a lower lay-off contribution. Thirdly, to account 
for the higher costs a collective dismissal imposes on society, the lay-off contribution should be 
higher in such a case. The current law
23 is often criticized for its lack of coherency. There is probably 
scope for improvement. Still, the idea of giving to unions the possibility to propose alternatives to 
the collective redundancy should be preserved. However, in accordance with the above arguments, 
the fact that the compensation currently only takes the form of severance payments to dismissed 
workers and not a contribution to the UI fund is not satisfactory.  
3. A relatively low severance payment. According to the theoretical principles, severance payments 
should only cover the psychic cost of job loss. These are certainly heterogeneous in the population – 
and this heterogeneity could hardly be taken into account - but on average relatively low for most 
workers. Since we argued that insurance provides a much more efficient protection against the 
unemployment risk than severance payments, we plead for transforming the bulk of the advance 
notice payments into lay-off contributions that finance the UI fund.  
                                                           
23  The so-called law “Renault”. 
Lay-off contribution 
€ 
Job tenure   9 
4. Improved coverage by the UI. The increased contribution to the UI fund that results from the new 
lay-off  contribution  could  be  used  to  provide  entitlement  for  workers  without  a  sufficient 
contribution record and to top up the existing UB for workers who did sufficiently contribute to the 
UI fund in the past. For the first group the amount to which they are entitled would be proportional 
to  the  lay-off  contribution.  Since  these  workers  in  general  have  little  labour  market  experience 
(otherwise they would be entitled to benefits under the current rules), the replacement ratio may be 
relatively low and, moreover, decreasing as to provide incentives. They would nevertheless be better 
off than in the current scheme. 
For the workers who have a sufficient contribution record, the increased contribution would allow to 
increase  the  coverage of UI  by  abolishing  the current  cap  and  by  raising  the  replacement  rate. 
Incentives  would  be  provided  by  gradually  decreasing  this  UB  supplement  with  unemployment 
duration until the current level of UB is attained
24.  
5. An additional funding for ALMP. The additional funds for UI should not only serve to finance the 
UB supplement. They should partly be assigned to training or employment subsidies to compensate 
for the loss in firm specific human capital. This is a key difference with the current scheme in which 
the worker only receives a financial compensation at lay-off and should decide himself/herself upon 
the amount to invest in active measures. Since the worker does not take into account the social 
benefit of his re-employment, the worker will certainly under-invest from a social point of view. We 
believe therefore that the explicit assignment of lay-off contributions to the provision of ALMP will 
lead to a more efficient functioning of the labour market.  
 
The  optimal  design  of  these  ALMP  is  crucial,  but  complicated  and  beyond  the  scope  of  this 
contribution.
25 Moreover, since in Belgium ALMP’s are essentially a regional competency, we need to 
conceive a sensible rule to divide these additional funds between the Regions. We refer the reader to 
Cockx and Van der Linden (2009) for a more elaborated discussion on this point. 
 
Notice that, since wages are often paid according to seniority rules
26, lay-off contributions reflecting 
the social cost of dismissal would be higher for more experienced workers. However, different from 
the current EPL in the new scheme the lay-off contribution would serve to invest in the activation of 
the laid-off older worker, through the provision of training and wage subsidies.
27 This would be much 
more efficient than the current schemes in which these funds are transferred directly to the worker: 
the worker assigns only funds to activation according to the private benefits that they generate and 
thereby under-invests, since the social benefits are much larger. 
                                                           
24 Possibly, one could introduce, additionally, hiring bonuses of which the level decreases with the unemployment duration 
(see footnote 19). 
25 See Cockx (2000) for a discussion of some of the involved issues and Cockx et al. (2007) for a proposal with regard the 
monitoring scheme for the unemployed. 
26 Many currently plead to replace the remuneration according to seniority by explicit incentive pay schemes. One should, 
however, be careful, since explicit performance payment schemes can be shown to be more efficient only if performance 
can be relatively easily measured. If this is not so, and this is often the case, then payment according to seniority may still 
be needed to provide the correct incentives (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  
27 There is no space here for recalling the drawbacks of early-retirement schemes as they are organized in Belgium (see e.g. 
Sneessens and Van der Linden, 2005).   10
6. Temporary lay-offs. In the current economic context, temporary lay-offs are extensively used for 
blue-collar workers and associations of employers call for an extension of the scheme to white collars 
(see footnote 14).  How can this scheme and its potential extension be seen in the light of the above 
recommendations? If the lay-off contribution is proportional to the social cost induced by the lay-off, 
in particular with the expected unemployment duration, no distinction would be made between 
temporary  and  permanent  lay-offs  for  economic  reasons.
28  However,  we  proposed  the  lay-off 
contribution to be independent of the expected unemployment duration. Being calculated on the 
basis of the average unemployment duration of a fired worker, this contribution would be too high 
for temporary lay-offs whose duration is typically  shorter. As a consequence, it makes sense to 
augment the regular UI scheme by one which finances temporary UB’s for lay-offs that last less than 
a  predetermined  fixed  number  of  days  per  year.  In  such  a  scheme  the  laid-off  worker  is  still 
contractually employed and knows in advance when her employer will recall her. Consequently, if a 
worker is not recalled, the employer still needs to pay the above-mentioned lay-off contribution. In 
addition, since temporary unemployment imposes a social cost, the employers would need to be 
made  accountable  for  the  extent to which  they make  use of  the  system. We  would  propose  a 
retrospective “experience rating”, similar as one of the forms that exists for the funding of UI in the 
US.
29 The employers contributions to the scheme would be made proportional to the time that their 
employees make  use  of  the  system:
30  this  guarantees  that  the  scheme would  only  be  used  for 
relatively  short  unemployment  spells.  Note  that  the  lack  of  experience  rating  (except  in  the 
contruction sector
31) is an important drawback of the existing system for blue-collar workers. On the 
other hand, there is no economic reason to exclude white-collar workers from such a scheme. 
7. Individual saving accounts are not the solution. Recently, the Austrian system of individual saving 
accounts has become a model for reform of the EPL (OECD 2006, European Commission 2006, Sels 
2008 and De Vos 2009). In such a scheme the employer contributes a proportion of the wage to an 
individual account of its employees. Laid-off workers with a seniority above some threshold (3 years 
in Austria) can choose to withdraw money from this savings account from the moment of dismissal 
or they may decide to accumulate the savings until a subsequent lay-off or, eventually they may use 
it as a form of pension fund that allows to top up the pension income after retirement.  
There are two main reasons why we oppose to such a scheme. First, since severance payments are 
financed by contributions before the lay-off occurs, such a scheme violates the first principle of 
accountability for the social costs it induces by dismissal. Such a scheme will therefore lead to a 
socially  inefficient  increase  in  the  number of  dismissals  in  the  economy.  Second,  relying on  the 
principle of individual saving, such a scheme is less efficient than an insurance scheme: workers with 
insufficient savings are not protected by the scheme and others will save too much for retirement. 
Proponents  of  the  individual  saving  accounts  would  counter  argue  that  an  insurance  scheme 
provides disincentives for work, which an individual savings account does not. However, a decreasing 
                                                           
28 Temporary lay-offs for other reasons can be maintained and even generalized to white collar workers, since these other 
reasons (climatic conditions, mechanical failure, a fire,…) are to a large extent out of the control of the firm and easily 
verified by a third party.  
29 There does not exist one scheme of experience rating in the US. Each state can decide upon a different scheme. In the 
Appendix we include a succinct description extracted from an OECD (2004) study. See also e.g. Fath and Fuest (2005) for a 
more detailed description.  
30 Note that a refinement consists in decreasing (increasing) the employer’s contribution as the business cycle goes down 
(up).  
31 See footnote 20.    11
profile of unemployment benefits and/or monitoring and counselling schemes in UI can cope with 
these disincentives without losing the main benefits of an insurance scheme. 
 
3. Conclusion 
Economists see job destruction as part of a process of innovation and growth (hence, the expression 
“creative destruction”). For most workers however, a lay-off is a disaster and an injustice. The reform 
proposed here takes both points of view into account. It renders both employers and employees 
more conscious of their responsibilities with respect to society as a whole.  
In a nutshell, we propose to transform the bulk of the advance notice payments currently paid to 
the  laid-off  worker  by  a  unique  lay-off  contribution  paid  to  the  Unemployment  Agency
32, 
independently of the type of worker (blue or white-collar) and type of contract (temporary or open-
ended). A relatively small severance payment is due to cover the psychic cost related to dismissal. In 
order to make the employer accountable for the costs he imposes on society, the lay-off contribution 
should be made proportional to the cumulative past earnings since the moment that the worker was 
hired in the firm. This contribution would be used not only to finance a supplement to the current 
unemployment benefits, but also, as to make the worker more accountable, to finance active labour 
market policies for the unemployed. Aside of this scheme, it makes sense to generalise the current 
scheme of temporary unemployment benefits for blue-collar workers to white-collar workers, but 
only to the extent that one introduces experience rating in the funding, so that again the employers 
are made accountable for the social costs that they induce by these temporary lay-offs.  
It is clear that much more work is needed to transform these principles into a directly implementable 




Box 2.5. The system of Experience Rating in the United States
33 
The United States is the only OECD country that makes widespread use of a tax on layoffs used to 
finance  UI  payments  to  dismissed  workers.  Employers’  social  security  contributions  are  partially 
“experience rated”, i.e. they are calculated partly on the basis of the layoff activity of the firm: a 
firm’s tax rate is determined by individual States based on the UI benefits paid to employees it has 
recently laid off. There is considerable variation across States in terms of how tax rates are precisely 
assessed. Each year the UI funds in each State fix a set of contribution rates based on the situation of 
their accounts. As a result, rates of employers’ contributions vary widely across States, both in terms 
of the minimum and maximum contribution rates and within these two boundaries. In fact, the only 
federal rule concerns the maximum contribution rate, which has to be at least equal to 5.4%. 
                                                           
32 Since in Belgium the UA is partly regionalized, this new funding should be partly shared among the Regional institutions. 
This is discussed in Cockx and Van der Linden (2009). 
33 This description is extracted from OECD (2004, p. 94)    12
To determine what contribution rate should apply to each firm, the vast majority of States follow 
either a “benefit ratio” approach or a “reserve ratio” method (see Fougère and Margolis, 2000). 
Under the “benefit ratio” system, firms pay taxes in proportion to the ratio of: 1) benefits charged to 
their account (paid to its laid-off employees); to 2) taxable wages, both averaged over the preceding 
three to five years. Under the “reserve ratio” system, firms pay taxes that are a function of the ratio 
of: 1) their reserves, that is past taxes less benefit payments accumulated over the entire history of 
the firm; to 2) their taxable payroll averaged over the preceding three years. Each approach yields a 
measure of how much a firm’s laid-off employees have drawn on the UI system over the previous 
three years. As this amount increases, the firm’s tax rate rises. 
Over the long life of this system, the contribution rate seems to have followed the economic cycle 
with some lag. This lag originates from the fact that UI funds fix their set of rates on the basis of the 
state of their accounts of the previous years. At the beginning of a recession, disbursements from UI 
funds increase while contribution rates remain unchanged. This continues until the UI funds balances 
worsen and a new, stricter set of contribution rates is introduced. When the balance of UI funds 
becomes negative, the government provides a loan. Reimbursing this loan may require contribution 
rates to remain high for a certain period after the end of the recession. 
In all States, experience rating is only partial in that taxes charged to a firm do not rise on a dollar-
for-dollar basis with benefits drawn by that firm’s laid-off workers. The lack of complete experience 
rating occurs for three reasons. First, a firm’s decision to lay off employees has no impact on its tax 
payments when it is either already at the maximum tax rate or below the minimum rate. Second, for 
firms that are between these two extremes, tax rate increases due to a change in the reserve/benefit 
ratio are typically insufficient to meet the full cost of the benefits resulting from layoffs. Third, in 
certain States, some UI benefits are not charged to the firm: for example, those paid to short-tenure 
employees,  students  who  have  returned  to  school,  or  individuals  whose  employers  have  gone 
bankrupt.  In  fact,  in  2002,  employers  covered  only  partially  the  expense  caused  by  their  layoff 
behaviour,  with  the  remaining  implicitly  funded  by  general  taxation.  Employers  coverage  varies 
considerably across States, ranging from 72% in New Hampshire to 14% in Georgia, and does not 
seem to depend much on the system used to calculate contribution rates.* 
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